I construct a novel measure of aggregate dispersion in economists' opinion on macroeconomic forecasts. The measure aggregates dispersion across relevant economic releases over one week and is used to predict stock returns in the subsequent week. I provide evidence that higher aggregate dispersion predicts lower future stock market returns by 27 basis points in the subsequent week. The impact is both statistically significant and economically large. My evidence does not support that aggregate dispersion is a risk measure and supports the theoretical explanations that heterogenous beliefs lead to lower future stock returns.
Introduction
Three main aspects of macroeconomic releases are found in literature to empirically impact conditional aggregate stock market returns such as S&P 500 index returns: macroeconomic announcement surprises, revisions, and the announcement days 1 . In this paper I add another dimension to above research. I construct a novel measure of aggregate differences of economists' opinions using the aggregate dispersion in economists' macroeconomic forecasts. The measure summarizes the differences of economists' opinion for economic releases that are considered most relevant by subscribers of Bloomberg Professional Service. I find the aggregate dispersion in economists' macroeconomic forecasts predicts lower S&P 500 index futures returns in the subsequent week. The impact is economically large and statistically significant controlling for financial and economic conditions. Before turning to details on empirical strategy and results, I should highlight three important contributions of this paper. First, this is the first paper that studies the impact of the dispersion of economist' opinions on conditional stock market returns. Both the data and construction method are novel in the literature. Second, my findings suggest that, aggregation of macroeconomic information, as a methodology, is important in forecasting longer horizon asset returns. This paper suggests investors view economic releases in a related manner, rather than in isolation. Indeed this paper contrasts with current literature that focuses on impact of individual releases on high frequency asset returns, or the same day returns at the time of announcement. Third, my findings that an increase in economic forecasts dispersion negatively predicts future stock returns controls for financial and economic conditions. The evidence does not support that aggregate dispersion is a risk measure and supports the theoretical explanations that heterogenous beliefs lead to lower future stock returns.
I empirically study the impact of aggregate differences of opinions in macroeconomic forecasts on future stock returns. Theoretical literature on heterogenous beliefs set forth by Miller (1977) shows that higher disagreement among investors leads to lower stock returns. My paper tests this hypothesis on the aggregate stock market level and find supportive evidence. The aggregate differences of opinion are constructed using relevant economic releases using Bloomberg data.
Each macroeconomic release in Bloomberg are followed by professional economists from major investment banks and consulting firms. The views tend to represent chief economists of the firm or submitted by the whole team. They submit their forecasts before each announcement to 1 I review the existing evidence later in this section.
Bloomberg. The economists have incentives to submit forecasts regularly and submit accurate forecasts because they are qualified and ranked by their accuracy history by Bloomberg. Their names or their banks' names are public to all subscribers. An accurate estimate records provides huge reputation for their careers and their firm within the investor space, and an inaccurate estimate is harmful in a similar way. To the extent that economists' views represent investors' views, the disagreement among their forecasts represents the heterogeneity of beliefs among investors. Given the widespread usage of Bloomberg among institutional investors, the high subscription rates of the economic releases and the high incentives among the economists to submit accurate forecasts, it is hard to argue investors ignore the views of these economists.
Of all available economic releases in Bloomberg Professional Service, I construct an index of relevant economic releases using releases with a relevance score above 50. The relevance score is computed by Bloomberg and ranges from 1 to 100. It measures the popularity of an economic release, representative of the number of alerts set for an economic event relative to all alerts set for all events in that country. I show that the relevance score captures the releases that most investors and academics pay attention to. Releases with higher score have more economists to follow and submit forecasts. Moreover, many of releases included in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) are also releases with higher relevance score.
For each of these relevant economic releases, I measure the difference of economists' opinion using the normalized economists' forecast standard deviation. I then sum up the differences across all the economic releases on each day and then aggregate during the week. I use this aggregate index to predict the stock returns in the subsequent week. This method avoids using overlapping returns 2 . I find that one standard deviation increase of aggregate dispersion predicts lower excess S&P 500 index futures returns by 27 basis points in the following week controlling for financial and economic conditions. For the discussion of economic magnitude, I construct an in-sample long-short strategy based on the aggregate forecast dispersion. The strategy yields 15% to 34% annual returns depending on the measures.
I use 15 years of daily Bloomberg data from 1998 to later 2012 to construct the dispersion in macroeconomic forecasts. I obtain 55 relevant economic releases whose relevance score is above 50. For each of these releases, I compute the normalized economists' forecast standard deviation and use it as a measure of differences of opinion among economists for that release. The normalization procedure is similar to Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) . I then construct aggregate the difference of opinions index by taking sum of the 21 releases on a daily basis.
Unlike announcement surprises, these differences of opinions are unitless by construction, hence it is appropriate to aggregate such information. I first sum up the dispersion each day across all the relevant releases, I then aggregate daily information to weekly frequency using three different aggregation methods: exponential moving average, sum and simple average. Indeed, in periods when there are many releases in a concentrated period, it is intuitive to aggregate such information rather than view them in isolation.
I estimate a linear model to investigate the response of excess returns of S&P 500 stock index futures in the subsequent week to the aggregate differences of opinion index. Similar to Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) , I control for variables that are known to affect conditional expected returns. The responses of the stock market can be due to two reasons: the actual aggregate forecast dispersion and the number of releases during the week. I therefore control for the number of announcement during the week.
The aggregate differences of opinion predicts lower stock returns in subsequence week by as much as 27 basis points depending on the measures. The results are significant at 5%. To ease comparison of the magnitude of impact across different measures I also construct an in-sample long-short strategy to long the index when the dispersion is low and short the index when the dispersion is high with holding period of one week. The strategy returns ranges from 27 to 57 basis points weekly, or 15% to 34% annually.
I define relevant economic releases as the releases with relevance score above 50. As a robustness check, I also use relevance score of 80 as an alternative cutoff point for relevant economic releases. The estimated coefficients more negative and remain significant at 10%. I use excess index futures returns as the stock market returns. However, the validity of using index futures returns depends on the right choice of futures contracts. I use excess spot index returns as an alternative measure to check if the results are driven by some of the illiquid contracts. The results remain similar both quantitatively and qualitatively.
The releases I use have mainly have monthly or quarterly frequency except that three releases have weekly release frequency: Initial Jobless Claims, Continuing Jobless Claims and Consumer Comfort Index. These releases have more weights in the aggregate dispersion as they have more observations in the sample. To test if the results are driven by these releases, I test the responses of stock market excluding these series. I find that the results remain similar both quantitatively and qualitatively. The strategy returns a relatively smaller bust still positive at 29 to 38 basis points per week or 16% to 21% annually. This paper is related to the macroeconomic literature that studies the relation between macroeconomic releases and conditional asset returns. In a high frequency framework, Andersen et al (2002) analyze the impact of announcement surprises of 41 macroeconomic announcements on spot high-frequency foreign exchange rates. They find that announcement surprises produce conditional mean jumps in high-frequency exchange rates. Andersen et al (2007) did the similar studies using high frequency stock, bond and foreign exchange futures contracts and found that macro economic surprises produces conditional mean jumps. They find that nonfarm payroll, new home sales, net exports,and ination systematically move prices. Brian Lucey and Singh (2008) find that U.S. macro economic shocks affect asset returns in other developed countries.
My paper is similar to the above in that I use many economic releases. However, I select the releases based on their relevance level and I do not have a prior. Moreover, instead of researching on each individual releases in isolation, I aggregate the information. When many economic announcements are released in a concentrated period, it is more natural to hypothesize that investors view the releases in a related manner rather than respond to individual releases in isolation.
McQueen and Roley (1993) studies announcement day stock returns and find that stock prices respond to macroeconomic announcement surprises depending on the business cycle. Boyd, Hu, and Jagannathan (2005) studies announcement day returns, and find that an announcement of rising unemployment is good news for stocks during economic expansions and bad news during economic contractions. Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) uses a GARCH model to study relation between announcement day returns and 17 candidate macroeconomic announcement. They find that three nominal and three real announcements are priced candidates.
The above studies uses announcement surprises and research on contemporaneous responses of stock returns on the announcement day. My paper differs with above research in that I use difference of opinion and study a predictive relationship on a weekly basis. Gilbert (2011) shows that investors care about future announcement revisions and this is reflected in the initial announcements returns. In spirit, their paper is similar to my paper where they suggest investors have an aggregation process in mind when viewing announcement releases. However, there is an important difference. They suggest the investors aggregate the inferred future revisions into announcement day stock returns, while I hypothesize investors aggregate information from different releases that are announced in a concentrated period. The differences of opinion I study are observed at the time of announcement, not inferred. Moreover, I study a predictive relation between information in macroeconomic forecast and future stock returns, not an explanatory relationship. Andrea and Whelan (2012) proxies macroeconomic disagreement on real economy and inflation. They found the disaggregate measure predicts positive bond returns in the next 12 months and have large R 2 . They conclude macroeconomic disagreement proxies for uncertainty risk. My paper is different from Andrea and Whelan (2012) in the following important ways: 1) I emphasize the importance of aggregating all the relevant economic releases and I don't have a prior in terms of which ones are relevant. The relevance score is determined by the subscribers of the releases. 2) I find disagreement predicts lower future stock returns rather than higher returns.
Higher disagreement leads to discount in future returns, rather than a premium. Therefore the risk explanation is not supported. 3) Strictly speaking, my results do not contradicts Andrea and Whelan (2012) . I study the predictability of stock returns on a weekly frequency. This benefits from the fact that I use a daily dataset to measure dispersion. Andrea and Whelan (2012) studies bond returns in the next 12 months. It may well be the case that higher disagreement for a long period of time indicates an uncertain environment and serves as a risk proxy. This leads to interesting future research.
Using quarterly data and focusing on forecasts of output, the output deflator, and Corporate Profits After Taxes, Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2009) found evidence that higher disagreement leads higher returns in the next quarter. My paper finds higher disagreement leads to lower returns on a weekly basis using aggregate dispersion measure.
My findings are consistent with the theoretical explanations that heterogenous beliefs impact future stock returns. Miller (1977) shows that under a setting of heterogenous beliefs among investors, due to high short-sale costs, prices will reflect a more optimistic valuation. In this model and other models developed by Morris (1996) , and Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) , stock prices are driven up the optimists' holding. The optimists suffer losses when market prices revert to their true value. The higher the disagreement about a stock's value, the lower the future returns. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Gromb and Vayanos (2002) prove that arbitrageurs due to financial constraints are not enough to eliminate the mispricing induced by optimists.
Empirically, my paper is related to a strand of firm-level literature on dispersion in analysts' earnings forecast and cross-sectional future stock returns. Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) stocks with higher dispersion in analysts' earnings forecast have lower future returns than otherwise similar stocks. My paper uses their method to construct dispersion in economists' forecast and study its impact on future aggregate stock market returns. In a time-series predictive setup, I also find higher dispersion leads to lower future stock returns, after controlling for lagged financial and economic conditions. My results support the theoretical explanations in heterogenous beliefs induced mispricing.
The findings in my paper cannot be explained by unpriced information risk such as in Johnson 
Data and Methodology
In this section, I describe the financial and economic data used this paper. I also describes in detail the construction of the aggregate dispersion in economists' forecast and their descriptive statistics.
Data
I use 15 years of daily US financial and economic data in Bloomberg from 1998 to 2012. The sample size is bounded by the macroeconomic data availability in Bloomberg.
I use non-overlapping weekly excess returns of S&P 500 index futures as the market returns in this paper. The weekly risk-free rate is obtained from Kenneth French's website. Following Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) , Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2006) , I use S&P 500 index futures contract. The use of an actively traded contract helps to interpret the results in a tradeable concept. S&P 500 index futures are actively traded and have lower transaction costs. In fact studies have shown that futures market often lead cash market in price discovery (Hasbrouck 2003) 3 . The returns are computed by taking the log difference of nearestto-deliver contracts as these are the most actively traded contracts. I use weekly returns from Wednesdays to Wednesdays in order to research relatively quick responses from the stock market while avoiding the problems associated with high frequency data such as nonsynchronous trading, bid-ask bounces etc Lo and MacKinlay (1988) . I use non-overlapping returns as estimation using overlapping returns can produce misleading standard errors of the estimates due to the autocorrelation induced by overlapping (Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2008) , BrittenJones, Neuberger, and Nolte (2011)).
There are 102 regular macroeconomic releases for US in Bloomberg. These releases are followed by economists. The economists self-select which releases to follow and how long they would follow them. Bloomberg ranks the economists based on two important criteria. First, they should provide regular forecast with at least two years of history. Second, economists are ranked based on their relative forecast accuracy compared with other economists. A Z-score based model is used to calculate the probability of forecast errors.
The releases are ranked by their relevance level. The relevance level is a measure of the popularity of the economic index, representative of the number of alerts set for an economic event relative to all alerts set for all events in US. A release with most numbers of alerts set is most relevant in this construction.
I choose releases with relevance score above 50, this is analogous to choosing top 50% of releases with highest numbers of alert set. The rationale is to have a stable group of releases that are "relevant" over time. In principle, the relevance score varies day-by-day based on the subscription of the alerts. The time series of relevance score is not recorded by Bloomberg.
Moreover using relevance score of 50 is equivalent to choosing the top 50% of the alerts and it is unlikely that there is much time variation in this group.
In Table 1 I list 55 releases with relevance score above 50. I include their full names, Bloomberg ticker and the variable names referred in this paper.
In Table 2 , I illustrate the details for 55 relevant releases, which have relevance score above 50. In the last column, I label the releases that also appear in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) . We can observe that releases with higher relevance score more likely to have been included in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) . This confirms the validity of the use of relevance score to measure relevant economic releases. It also confirms that the academics and industry practitioners generally share the same view in what macroeconomic announcements are relevant.
We can also observe that most of the releases have monthly or quarterly frequency, except three releases: Initial Jobless Claims, Continuing Jobless Claims and Consumer Comfort Index.
One natural concern is that the results can be driven by the weekly releases as they have the highest release frequency and most observations. In the results section I check this hypothesis and show that the results are not driven by weekly releases.
Individual Dispersion of Opinions
In this section, I describe the construction of the aggregate dispersion of opinions. I also discuss the construction of the announcement surprises as they are used as control variables in later sections.
Standard deviation of the forecasts for each announcement is obtained from Bloomberg. It measures for each economic release the standard deviation of the economists' forecast. Similarly, the mean and median forecast are also computed by Bloomberg for each release. I also obtain the number of forecasts for each release.
Similar to Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) , I define dispersion for each individual release as the standard deviation of the forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean forecast. Following Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) , I define the announcement surprises as the the difference between actual announcement value and forecast scaled by its sample standard deviation.
In Table 3 , I describe the mean and standard deviation of the forecast dispersion and announcement surprises. It is obvious to see that the dispersion for each release have positive mean. This is by construction. The average surprises for most releases are not significantly different from zero.
I show the average number of forecasts submitted to Bloomberg by economists for individual releases in column (6). We can observe that unlike the firm-level analyst forecasts, there are generally many economists following a relevant release. The number of economists submitting forecasts can be as many as 72, and this is more than MMS, another data set that is used widely in the literature. MMS gathers economic forecasts from around 40 money managers. Lastly we can observe that releases with higher relevance score also tend to have more economists to follow and submit forecasts.
Aggregate Dispersion of Opinions
I standardize the dispersion for each individual release by their sample mean and standard deviation. The rationale is similar to Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) , except that in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) only sample standard deviation is needed for the standardization while the dispersion is standardized by taking out sample mean and standard deviation. This is because the announcement surprises have zero means for most cases as shown in Table 3 , while dispersion, by construction, has positive means as shown in Table 3 .
I sum up the standardized dispersion for each day and then aggregate it on a weekly basis.
The aggregation is done on a weekly basis because I study the non-overlapping weekly response of stock market. The choice of aggregation method is an empirical approximation on the process of investors aggregating information over the week. To show that the results are not specific to a particular aggregation methods I construct three measures of aggregate forecast dispersion.
That is, I use exponential moving average, sum or simple average of daily standardized dispersion over the week to construct aggregate dispersion measures. In exponential moving average, more weight is given to the latest information and less weight to stale information over the week.
The maintained assumption is that newest information is more relevant. Compared to simple average and exponential moving average, sum of forecast dispersion during the week is more volatile overtime.
Methodology
I test my main empirical hypothesis concerning the link between aggregate forecast dispersion and stock returns using White's adjusted heteroscedastic consistent least-squares regression. I test a predictive regression of non-overlapping weekly S&P 500 index futures returns on aggregate dispersion and lagged controls.
It is shown in the literature the market expected returns depend on a set up variables related to financial and economic conditions. Following Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) , I
include the following controls that are found to influence conditional expected returns in previous research. All the variables are lagged one week following the literature. The yield-to-maturity of three-month Treasury Bill (TB3M), the term spread (TS) and the credit spread (CS) are used following Fama (1990) . Term spread is computed as the difference between yield-to-maturity of the ten-year Treasury bond and three-month Treasury bill. The credit spread is computed as the different in the yield to maturity between Moody's BAA and AAA corporate bond indices. Own stock returns (SPRet) are used following Fama (1991) and Savor and Wilson (2012) . Dividend price ratio (DY) is used following Fama and French (1989) and Fama (1990) . The log of the market capitalization (LOGMKT) is used as well. All the data for above control variables are from Bloomberg.
It is important to disentangle the impact of the number announcements every week from the aggregate forecast dispersion. The responses of the stock market to the aggregate forecast dispersion can be decomposed into its response the actual dispersion, and the fact that there are many announcements in that week. I control for this possibility by including the number of announcement in that week. The the rationale is similar to Savor and Wilson (2012) in that the the uncertainty built up around announcements lead to stock market to respond. The difference between the test in this paper and Savor and Wilson (2012) is that they study the impact on stock market on the same day, while I'm studying the response in the following week.
Summary Statistics
I summarize the aggregate dispersion of opinions and control variables in Table 4 . In Panel A, I
show the summary statistics for each regressors. We can see that all three aggregate dispersion measure have around zero mean. When using In Panel B, I show the correlation among the regressors. We can see that the aggregate dispersion measures have high correlation among each other. Aggregate dispersion computed using simple average and the dispersion computed using sum has correlation of 96%. The measure using exponential moving average has relatively smaller correlation but still high at 82%. This is expected as on exponential method gives different weight to later information while simple average and sum method are equal weighted.
All the aggregate dispersion measures are positively correlated with TS and CS. It suggests that dispersion is larger when the liquidity conditions and credit conditions worsen. The measures are positively correlated with dividend yield and negatively correlated with log of market.
It implies the dispersion tend to large the the market is stressed the stock prices drop.
In Figure 1 , I show one year moving average of the aggregate dispersion measures. We can see that all three measures are larger during the recession. We can also see all three measure moves closely together, except that the sum measure is more volatile.
To ease the interpretation of the magnitude economic impact of aggregate forecast dispersion on stock market, I also include a simple long-short strategy returns. The strategy is long the stock market when it belongs to bottom 20% of aggregate dispersion and short when it belongs to top 20% of aggregate dispersion measure. The holding period for the strategy is one week.
For a time-series strategy, this is in-sample and so has no investment implication since ex ante it is not clear when bottom 20% of aggregate dispersion. The purpose of the test is to make the three aggregate dispersion measure comparable in terms of their economic impact.
Regression Results
In this section, I estimate the responses of stock market to aggregate forecast dispersion. I first present the main results of the paper: stock market strongly respond to aggregate forecast dispersion. I then show that the stock market responses to individual forecast dispersion are as expected but statistically weaker.
Responses of Stock Market to Aggregate Dispersion of Opinions
In Table 5 , I present the results from a forecast regression of non-overlapping weekly S&P 500 index futures excess returns on weekly aggregate dispersion and controls. In column (1), (3) and (5), I present the regression results without controlling for the number of announcement but controlling for other economic and financial information. Results in Table 5 confirms the findings in literature, the control variables are significant and signs are as expected. Evidence also confirms that the aggregate dispersion measures are negative and significant at 5% an 10% level. In column (2), (4) and (6) I present the regression results including the number of announcements for each aggregate dispersion measure. We can see that first, the number of announcement in all specifications are significant at 10%. Second, both the magnitude and the significance of the coefficients on aggregate forecast dispersion do not change. This suggests aggregate forecast dispersion significantly impact stock market returns in the following week.
Moveover, the impact is not due the number of announcements in each week.
To interpret the economic magnitude of aggregate forecast dispersion. We can see from column (1) to column(6) for one standard deviation move of aggregate dispersion, depending on the measures, lead to 5 to 27 basis lower stock returns in the following week. Their economic impacts are not so different when associated with their standard deviation in Table 4 . Another way to interpreted the economic impact is through the strategy returns on bottom of column (1), (3) and (5), we can see that the strategy returns range from 27 basis points to 57 basis points weekly, or 15% to 34% annually. As I mentioned earlier, this is in-sample and so does not have any investment implication and mainly for the purpose of interpret the magnitude of economic impact.
To summarize, the aggregate forecast dispersion leads to lower future stock market returns next week. The impact is significant controlling for financial and economic conditions. Both the magnitude and significance of estimates are not affected by the number of announcements during the week, even though the number of announcements also leads to lower future stocks returns. The above evidence suggests the stock market reflects optimists view and correct itself in the following week.
Responses of Stock Market to Aggregate Dispersion of Opinions with
Relevance Score above 80
In previous tests, I define relevant economic releases as the releases with relevance score above 50. If relevance score is a right measure, aggregating releases with higher score may have larger impact to the stock market. However, the use of higher relevance score as cutoff also means fewer releases are taken. The group of releases with relevance score above 80 can be more time specific. The aggregate dispersion is more likely to be driven by outliers. The overall effect of using a higher relevance score to define relevant releases is not clear. It is the empirical question I investigate in this section.
I use relevance score of 80 as the cutoff point for relevant economic releases and yield 21
releases. This itself serves as a robustness check. More importantly it tests if higher relevance score leads to larger impact to future stock returns. The choice of 80 is to differentiate findings from those above 50 relevance score while maintaining a meaningful number releases for aggregation purpose.
I present the regression results and strategy returns in Table 6 . The coefficients on aggregate dispersion are in fact larger compared to those in Table 5 . The estimates are all borderly significant at 10% except one. The results suggest the responses from stock markets are stronger, but also more volatile when more relevant economic releases are considered.
The number of announcements during the weekly is still negatively related to future stock returns in all measures. The coefficients are larger as well but are no longer significant. The estimates for other controls do not change much.
Strategy returns are on the bottom of Table 6 , the weekly returns range from 17 basis points per week to 51 basis points per week, or 8% to 30% annually. It is interesting to compare the strategy returns in Table 5 and Table 6 , the weekly strategy returns are similar despite that we use aggregate forecast dispersion with relevant score above 80. This may suggest the two measures are correlated to a large extent, which is natural as releases with score above 80 is a subset of those with relevance score above 50.
To summarize, evidence using relevance score of 80 as cutoff point confirms that higher dispersion leads to lower stock returns in the next week. The impact is larger, and significant at 10% level.
Responses of S&P 500 Index Spot Market
I use index futures in previous section because index futures are liquid and has low transaction costs. There is also evidence showing that futures market have faster price discovery than spot index (Hasbrouck 2003) .
However, there also many studies use S&P 500 spot index as stock market returns, especially in a lower frequency framework 4 . One advantage of using spot market is that one does not need to decide which futures contracts are most liquid and roll over contracts.
In previous sections, I use nearest-to-deliver contracts to compute futures returns as they are considered to be most liquid contracts. If they are not liquid, then the previous evidence may be related to liquidity premium. It may well be the case that an increase in aggregate forecast dispersion coincides with the worse liquidity conditions and the strong responses are from the illiquid contracts.
In fact in Table 4 and Figure 1 , we do observe the aggregate forecast dispersion is larger when credit condition worsen and such times often coincide with worse liquidity condition. A robustness check that use alternative measures is therefore necessary.
To test whether the my results are sensitive to usage of possible illiquid futures contracts, I
therefore also test my empirical hypothesis using the S&P 500 spot index returns as a robustness check. If the usage of futures contracts are appropriate, we should expect similar findings due to the tight arbitrage relationship between spot and futures markets.
The results are presented in Table 7 . The aggregate dispersion is still negative and significant.
Moveover, the magnitude does not change much from Table 5 where futures contracts are used.
But coefficients on number of announcements during the week is no longer significant. The other control variables have similar estimates as in Table 5 . The strategy returns are also similar as before ranging from 26 to 55 basis points weekly.
To summarize, evidence in this sections shows aggregate forecast dispersion are negative and significant in both futures and spot markets. However, the negative coefficients on number of announcements are only significant in futures markets and hence less robust.
Excluding Announcements with Weekly Frequency
Most of the releases I use have monthly or lower release frequency, except that three releases have weekly release frequency. Namely, Initial Jobless Claims, Continuing Jobless Claims and Consumer Comfort Index. This implies in aggregation, these three releases have relatively more weights than other releases as they have more observations. One natural concern is that the results are driven by these three weekly releases. I therefore test my hypothesis excluding these three weekly releases.
The results are in Table 8 . We can observe that the estimated coefficients on aggregate dispersion are not affected by the weekly releases. Both the magnitude and the significance do not change much. The strategy returns are somewhat smaller but still ranges from 29 basis points to 38 basis points per week or 16% to 22% annually.
In summary, I test the hypothesis that the higher aggregate forecast dispersion leads to lower future stock returns. The hypothesis is strongly supported by the data. The results are robust to risk controls, aggregation methods, different instruments and different cutoff points for relevance scores.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper I provide evidence that higher dispersion in economists' forecast predicts lower stock returns in the next week. My results are not driven by risk as I control for financial and economic conditions that affect conditional stock returns as shown in the literature. They include lagged stock returns, 3-month treasury bill, term spread, credit spread, dividend yield and log market capitalization.
The economic magnitude of the aggregate dispersion is large. In terms of magnitude, one standard deviation move of the aggregate dispersion measure leads to future stock returns lower by 5 basis points to 27 basis points per week depending on the measure. For purpose of comparing magnitude of impact of different dispersion measures, I construct an in-sample long short strategy of buying index when dispersion is low and short index when dispersion is high. The strategy yields weekly returns of 27 basis points to 57 basis points, or 15% to 34%.
I define relevant releases if it has a relevance score above 50. The results are robust to alternative cutoff points. When I define relevant releases using relevance score above 50, the estimated coefficients are larger but also more noisy.
I test the robustness of the choice of instruments by using spot index returns. This is to test if the use of futures contracts are appropriate. The results are robust to the alternative return measures.
All the economic releases I use have monthly or quarterly frequency except for three releases which have weekly frequency. I exclude those three releases to test whether the results are driven by releases with more observation. The results are robust to exclusion of the weekly releases.
To summarize I consider the stock market respond strongly to aggregate forecast dispersion on a weekly basis. The evidence is consistent with the findings in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) , the later studies the relation of dispersion and stock returns on a firm level. My evidence does not support that aggregate dispersion is a risk measure and supports the theoretical explanations that heterogenous beliefs impact future stock returns. This paper's main task is to present the strong evidence that aggregate differences in economists' macroeconomic forecasts, or aggregate forecast dispersion predicts further stock returns. As a new measure, it is important to investigate further into aggregate forecast dispersion.
There are at least two interesting directions for future research. First, as an out-of-sample test, it is interesting how does this measure behaves in an international setting. It also helps to describe more serious trading strategies with more markets are involved. The use of relevance score fits an international setup when one considers different releases are more important depending on country characteristics. For example, in an export oriented country, trading balance might be more relevant for the right reason.
Second, further investigation to the nature of such measure is needed. Its relation of firmlevel analyst dispersion needs more understanding. Do they proxy for heterogenous belief in a similar way? Are they both proxying for some latent risk measures? This is another direction for future research. (1). The number of observation for the sample period from 1998 to 2012 is in column (2). The starting date of the series is in column (3). The end date for all series is Nov 2012. The announcement frequency is in column (4). The relevance score for each announcement is in (5). The announcement is shown "Yes" in column (7) if it is included in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) 
Continuing Jobless Claims This table describes the mean and standard deviation for individual relevant economic releases and number of economists' forecasts for each releases. Column (1) and (3) show mean and standard deviation of dispersion.
Column (4) shows mean of announcement surprises. Column (6) shows the average number of forecasts submitted to Bloomberg by economists for individual releases. Column (2) and column (5) to lagged S&P 500 equity index futures excess weekly returns. TB3M refers to the yield-to-maturity of three-month Treasury Bill. TS refers to the term spread, which is the yield-to-maturity difference between 10-year Treasury bond and 3-month Treasury bill. CS refers to the credit spread, which is the difference in the yield to maturity between Moody's BAA and AAA corporate bond indices. DY refers to dividend yield. LOGMKT refers to the log of market capitalization. The p values are reported below the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level respectively. Strategy Ret. Refers to weekly returns from an in-sample strategy that long index when aggregate dispersion is in bottom 20% and short index when aggregate dispersion is in top 20% and hold for one week. to lagged S&P 500 equity index futures excess weekly returns. TB3M refers to the yield-to-maturity of three-month Treasury Bill. TS refers to the term spread, which is the yield-to-maturity difference between 10-year Treasury bond and 3-month Treasury bill. CS refers to the credit spread, which is the difference in the yield to maturity between Moody's BAA and AAA corporate bond indices. DY refers to dividend yield. LOGMKT refers to the log of market capitalization. The p values are reported below the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level respectively. Strategy Ret. Refers to weekly returns from an in-sample strategy that long index when aggregate dispersion is in bottom 20% and short index when aggregate dispersion is in top 20% and hold for one week. to lagged S&P 500 equity index spot excess weekly returns. TB3M refers to the yield-to-maturity of three-month Treasury Bill. TS refers to the term spread, which is the yield-to-maturity difference between 10-year Treasury bond and 3-month Treasury bill. CS refers to the credit spread, which is the difference in the yield to maturity between Moody's BAA and AAA corporate bond indices. DY refers to dividend yield. LOGMKT refers to the log of market capitalization. The p values are reported below the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level respectively. Strategy Ret. Refers to weekly returns from an in-sample strategy that long index when aggregate dispersion is in bottom 20% and short index when aggregate dispersion is in top 20% and hold for one week. (Average) except the aggregation is done by summing up dispersion in forecasts with relevance score above 50 each day excluding weekly releases and taking sum from previous Thur to current Wed inclusive. Agg. Disp. (EWMA) is the same as previous two measures except that the exponential moving average is taken. Num. Ann. refers to number of releases each week. LagRet refer to lagged S&P 500 equity index futures excess weekly returns. TB3M refers to the yield-to-maturity of three-month Treasury Bill. TS refers to the term spread, which is the yield-to-maturity difference between 10-year Treasury bond and 3-month Treasury bill. CS refers to the credit spread, which is the difference in the yield to maturity between Moody's BAA and AAA corporate bond indices. DY refers to dividend yield. LOGMKT refers to the log of market capitalization. The p values are reported below the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Strategy Ret. Refers to weekly returns from an in-sample strategy that long index when aggregate dispersion is in bottom 20% and short index when aggregate dispersion is in .
top 20% and hold for one week. 
